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In this paper, I review fifty four research papers spanning a 10 year period between 
1998 and 2008 on research questions related to microfinance and entrepreneurship.  I 
highlight the main research questions, summarize the most common methodological 
approaches and key findings, and offer observations on gaps in the literature with suggestions 





The productivity of a community is correlated with its accumulated human capital and 
the capital stock (i.e., technology) to leverage that human capital.  In subsistence economies, 
where the capital component of the production function is small, the consumption possibility 
frontier is given by the available human capital.  Hence, in order for a community to rise 
above its consumption possibility frontier, it has to accumulate capital (i.e., technology) at a 
rate faster than consumption.   
Among development economists, there is a notion of the ‘energy deficit’ in 
community welfare.  This is when the energy expended by a community to engage in 
consumption (searching for food, drawing water from long distances, subsistence farming, 
and the like) does not yield a production surplus that can foster deferred consumption (Elahi 
and Danopoulos, 2004). Deferred consumption is critical for consumption smoothing to 
account for negative shocks to productivity.  For example, during droughts, grain stock may 
be depleted by current consumption to the extent that little is left over for the next planting 
cycle, effectively cutting off the possibility of future consumption (Mckenzie and Woodruff, 
2006).  This ‘poverty trap’ ensures a continual dependence on external injections of resources 
such as food aid without the potential for a community to reach endogenously stable 
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consumption/production equilibrium. Poverty traps are hence associated with poor human 
health and nutrition, public hygiene, education, and other social bads that, in turn, increase 
the energy deficit in a never ending spiral of human misery (Adams and Raymond, 2008; 
Mckenzie and Woodruff, 2006). 
Therefore, it has been argued, a way to break the poverty trap is to encourage petty 
entrepreneurship among the poor, in order to foster production surpluses (Varghese, 2005). 
This is accomplished by increasing the capital component of the entrepreneurial production 
function to leverage the individual’s human capital, since in the short run the productivity of 
human capital cannot be significantly improved. The resulting elimination of the energy 
deficit leads to capital accumulation, consumption smoothing, and the possibility of sustained 
future production. Accordingly, micro-credit, as the means to increased capital, is the primary 
input to kick-start the entrepreneurial production process in these communities (Midgely, 
2008).   
Note that micro-credit has, in one form or another, been available to poor 
communities for centuries.  It is not a modern concept (Adams and Raymond, 2008; Hollis 
and Sweetman, 1998).  Moneylenders and chettiars have existed for a long time in Chinese 
and Indian communities to provide credit at high interest rates.  The fact that the poverty trap 
persists is also not, apparently, due to the high interest rates attached to these forms of 
financing (Varghese, 2005).  Instead, it appears to be a combination of social stigma from 
failed attempts at entrepreneurship, institutional constraints on lending practices, and the 
inability to recovery quickly from setbacks such as natural disasters and personal loss such as 
the death of a household earner.  This realization has led modern micro-credit practices to 
address the social and political impediments to entrepreneurship as much as they try to solve 
the problem of credit availability, adverse selection and moral hazard (Hollis and Sweetman, 




Research in Microfinance 
 
Microfinance in Theory 
Early studies in microfinance sought to understand why they worked or didn’t (Nair, 
2001; Brau and Woller, 2004).  The typical structure of a microloan, typically a few dollars to 
less than two hundred dollars, involves the creation of a loan committee composed of trusted 
members (usually elders) of a village or community.  The loan committee then makes loans 
to groups of four or five borrowers who are known to each other (some program prohibit 
relatives from belonging to the same borrowing group) who then decide among themselves 
who will get the first tranche of loans.  These ‘solidarity groups’ meet weekly to discuss their 
businesses, problems, and family issues, all of which impact the ability of the member to 
repay on time.  Groups receive advice from program officers, who often act, as with the 
Grameen Bank, as family counselors, social workers, emergency first responders, and 
financial advisors (Chavan and Ramakumar, 2002; Hassan, 2002).  Such extreme relationship 
management practices are designed to build trust, compound social capital, and strengthen 
network ties among the borrowers and the micro finance institution or mFI.  In the early days 
of the Grameen Bank, founded by Dr. Mohammed Yunus in Bangladesh, for example, bank 
officers found it difficult to give out loans because of suspicion among villagers, and 
experienced push back from the village chettiars (moneylenders) that viewed the Bank as 
competition.  Bank officers resorted to social work to first build trust before promulgating 
their loan program (Hassan, 2002).   
 
Microfinance in Practice 
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According to the theory, the purpose of micro-finance is tto enable the acquisition of 
technological capital to kick-start the entrepreneurial process (Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, 
Gonzalez-vega and Rodriguez-meza, 2000).  Yet, politically, the idea that the free market can 
help break debt cycles and foster income-generating market activities within poor 
communities did not gain recognition until the publicity won by the Grameen Bank (Hassan, 
2002). Government social policy could not reconcile the high interest rates associated with 
micro debt markets and indeed often sort to shut down those markets by enforcing usury laws 
(Crabb, 2008; Elahi and Danopoulos, 2004; Tsai, 2004).  
From a business standpoint, other obstacles have denied poor people access to credit, 
such as the lack of collateral. No standard existed to affirm how financial institutions could 
benefit from bearing the administrative costs and the risks of loaning to the poor (Brau and 
Woller, 2004). Servicing microloans or monitoring the provision of grants is economically 
infeasible for traditional financial institutions and government because of the costs of 
identifying, delivering, and monitoring micro-credit to communities who are not already part 
of the market economy (Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-vega and Rodriguez-meza, 
2000; Tsai, 2004).   
However, mFIs such as Grameen Bank have shown that the notion credit must be 
extended in large quantities to be profitable is false (Hassan, 2002). Grameen Bank and 
others have given loans to solidarity groups of five people, using the opportunity for 
everyone in the group to secure future credit as collateral, with peer pressure as an additional 
incentive to ensure repayment. By charging market interest rates (or higher than market 
interest rates), these institutions are able to cover their administrative costs while enjoying 




In sum, much of the early research on mFI sought to understand the role and impact 
of non-traditional methods of delivering credit and for sustaining lending capacity to the poor 
(Brau and Woller, 2004).  For example, by charging high interest rates, mFIs can afford the 
high transaction costs of processing large volumes of loans as small as a few dollars. The 
specific forms of micro-financing, e.g., lending to groups rather than individuals, bringing 
financial capital to the borrower rather than waiting for the borrower to apply for funding, 
and so on are ways to mitigate the specific social and structure impediments that make 
traditional forms of financial assistance ineffective or economics infeasible (Navajas, 
Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-vega and Rodriguez-meza, 2000).   
It has been noted in the literature that group lending affects the behavior of the poor 
by altering economic incentives through the provision of credit and by providing social 
development inputs intended to influence behaviors. It is has also been argued that group 
lending gives the poor dignity and self-esteem that comes from having control over the future 
of their lives and those of their progeny (Crabb, 2008).  It is thought that such psychological 
resiliency enables individuals to overcome the inevitable shocks that come with regions 
known for drought, wars, floods, and other man-made and natural disasters.   
 
Dependent Variables in the Research 
My reading of the literature suggests a number of clearly identifiable questions being 
addressed.  The first seeks to characterize micro-lending programs along a continuum of 
goals anchored by sustainability, given by the repayment rate and depth of lending capacity 
on one end, and outreach, given by the degree to which the program alleviates poverty and 
attendant problems (health, fertility, education, nutrition, and the like), and community 
welfare (Field and Pande, 2008).   
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The early research on the effectiveness of program outreach focused on the use of 
loan funds for consumption versus investment by borrowers.  Given that the ability to engage 
in entrepreneurial activity is predicated on a minimal level of human capital (health, 
competence, personal motivation and drive, knowledge and so on), it is expected that part of 
the use of microloans would be devoted to increasing household human capital (Elahi and 
Danopoulos, 2004). Such immediate consumption will attenuate the intensity of technological 
capital and hence the future earning potential of the entrepreneur. Additionally, measures of 
outreach have converged around the six dimensions of: worth to clients, cost to clients, depth, 
breadth, length, and scope out outreach (Schreiner, 2002; Chowdhury, Mosley and 
Simanowitz, 2004; Patten, Rosengard and Johnston Jr., 2001). 
The early literature tend to model these goals as exclusive and hence attempt to find 
the normative sweet spot that balances the two goals, reasoning that sustainability implies 
higher interest rates, less loan forgiveness, and relatively lower risk tolerance for extremely 
poor borrowers.  The later research tend to model the two goals as necessary to each other in 
that outreach goals can only be achieved if the program’s sustainable goals are met (Vigenina 
and Kritikos, 2004).   
The social desirability of poverty alleviation has tended to influence much of the early 
research toward normative theory building (Adams and Raymond, 2008; Elahi and 
Danopoulos, 2004).  As a consequence the early empirical literature focused on finding 
models of successful programs and thus mainly employed clinical case studies with rich 
descriptions of program structure and program outcomes (Hollis and Sweetman, 1998).  As 
with most research employing case studies, the earlier work selected on the dependent 
variable (program success) and hence resulted in few testable hypotheses.  Later studies stuck 
with the normative approach, and attempted verify the models by measuring program 
sustainability such as repayment rates, loan portfolio size, spread between market and 
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program interest rates, the need for continual or periodic subsidies to replenish loan capacity, 
and the like. They also investigated the consequence of program outreach such as the depth of 
reach into the poorest communities, the size of loans, the number of communities lifted from 
poverty levels, new microenterprise starts, sustainability of microenterprises after they have 
launched, and so on (e.g., Nair, 2001; Field and Pande, 2008). 
The follow up to clinical studies on program structure and outcomes naturally focused 
on building and assessing models of program evaluation and impact assessment 
(Crombrugghe, Tenikue and Sureda, 2008; Hollis and Sweetman, 2001).  Here, the questions 
revolved on data collection and verification, discussions on the use of parametric versus non-
parametric approaches to measuring outcomes, and the appropriate outcome variables to 
measure.  At this time, there does not appear to be a common standard for evaluation, with 
each program using its own sets of measures.  In part, this has resulted from programs being 
extensions of aid projects and the implications for showing program success to ensure the 
continuation of funding.  Researchers who have attempted to do cross program evaluations 
have run into data incompatibility arising from differences in definitions, and unreliable 
reporting from the field (Adams and Raymond, 2008).  
The most common methods in the research employed surveys or used data from 
surveys taken by program administrators with regression analysis to report model fit.  Later 
studies employed panel data and the appropriate regression techniques to correct for obvious 
problems related to program, and region fixed effects (e.g., Amin, Rai and Topa, 2003; 
Crombrugghe, Tenikue and Sureda, 2008).  
There has been more progress on descriptive theory building than theory testing.  
Early normative models gave way to descriptive models that discovered the importance of the 
social network dimensions of microfinance (Nair, 2001; Karlan and Zinman, 2008).  Because 
microfinance used a group lending model, it was quickly discovered that network effects 
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played an important role in solving the adverse selection and moral hazard problem since 
borrowers were only able to obtain the next round of financing if everyone in the borrowing 
group paid up in full.   
Thus, early methods to understand such dynamics used multistage game theoretic 
models with varying (dis)incentive schemes and payoff matrices to a. understand where the 
forces for self governance came from (the preservation of social capital or the structure of the 
payoffs) and b. build normative models to assess variations of the standard micro-lending 
contract, such as debt forgiveness, size of lending group, punishment for strategic non-
payment, and so on (Hollis and Sweetman, 2001; Hudon, 2008; Velasco and Marconi, 2004). 
Although mFIs generate revenue for their activities through philanthropy and deposit 
taking (Hollis and Sweetman, 1998; Hudon, 2008), more attention has been paid to the 
philanthropy activities of mFIs with been paid to their deposit taking function.  In regions that 
are regularly visited by natural disasters such the annual flooding in Indian sub-continent 
delta, deferred consumption is critical to enterprise recovery and continuity.  However, not 
much is known about what mFIs do with deposits, such as whether they employ traditional 
deposit based revenue generating methods (i.e., investing) and how they manage this activity.  
Given that microentrepreneurs have to save in order to foster enterprise continuity and capital 
accumulation, mFIs are well positioned to enable such capabilities. Indeed many have 
developed parallel programs to educate borrowers on risk and money management strategies, 
beginning with strategies to defer consumption.     
 
Policy Research on mFIs 
Policy research revolves around the question of whether government intervention in 
the microfinance industry, for example by imposing interest rate ceilings, ultimately impacts 
outreach depth and effectiveness (Coleman, 2006; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Rankin, 
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2002; Schreiner, 2002).  The research seems to suggest that government intervention that 
increases the risk exposure of mFIs tend to trigger a portfolio selection mechanism that 
ultimately results in the less poor obtaining most of the available loan capital, i.e., shallower 
program reach (Chowdhury, Mosley and Simanowitz, 2004).   
Research on the program outreach of mFIs has also sought to answer the difficult 
question of what is meant by effectiveness, which has important policy implications (Amin, 
Rai and Topa, 2003; Chowdhury, Mosley and Simanowitz, 2004; Crombrugghe, Tenikue and 
Sureda, 2008; Schreiner, 2002).  For example, on the relationship between government policy 
and mFI objectives there is convergence in the area of poverty alleviation (Tsai, 2004). 
However, in other areas government objectives conflict with mFI objectives; for example 
distributive justice and fairness cannot always be fully achieved if mFIs are concerned about 
program sustainability (Nair, 2001; Rankin, 2002; Tsai, 2004).   
Additionally, government tends to view microfinance as a substitute for direct aid 
(grant), so that mFIs are viewed as simply a more effective form of aid distribution 
(Chowdhury, Mosley and Simanowitz, 2004; Karlan and Zinman, 2008). Hence, government 
policies (e.g., encouraging loan forgiveness or lower credit standards) that govern mFIs favor 
those focusing on outreach, whereas mFIs that view microcredit as an input for sustain 
entrepreneurship cannot allow revenue shortfalls to occur since to do so will limit 
sustainability (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007).   
As discussed earlier, attached to issues on program outreach are those related to 
program sustainability since the ability reach out is fundamental determined by the health of 
the loan portfolio and capacity (Crombrugghe, Tenikue and Sureda, 2008; Shreiner, 2002).  
The research here divides into concerns over repayment and contract incentives to maximize 
repayment, and concerns over competition between mFIs in a region (Morduch, 1999; 
Varghese, 2005).  The key phenomenon related to mFI competition is the risk of multiple 
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loans to the same individuals, usually brought about by competition among mFIs in the same 
area (Coleman, 2006; McIntosh, Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005; McIntosh and Wydick, 2005).  
Multiple loans weaken the repayment (dis)incentives imposed by the mFIs since the financial 
costs of defaulting on any particular loan is mitigate by access to alternate sources of capital 
(Hartaska, 2005).   
More significantly, some research has focused on the problems attending competition 
between mFIs and government grant programs.  The latter tend to provide capital at little or 
no interest but due to the difficult of identifying and reaching the poorest borrowers often end 
up providing capital to the less poor, often in urban areas (Coleman, 2006). mFIs, on the 
other hand, have the mechanism for deeper outreach into the rural regions but can only do so 
if they can recover the high cost of their capital.  The theoretical approach typically used to 
study competition between repayment is agency theory, in which the issues is the research  
 
The Concept of Social Collateral and its Relationship to Microfinance 
In the most recent literature, the notion of social collateral (as a corollary to social 
capital) has become the basis for understanding why repayment rates were so high 
(Anderson, Locker and Nugent, 2002; Dowla, 2006; Mosley, Olejarova and Alexeeva, 2004).  
The argument is that the loss of social collateral represents a destruction of social support and 
resource acquisition capability in rural communities that are naturally collective oriented 
(Pickering and Mushinski, 2001).  The resulting loss of a social safety net impacts human 
health, nutrition, and security as those without social collateral are not able to engage in the 
social exchanges necessary for consumption smoothing in times of personal resource paucity 
(Dowla, 2006; Pickering and Mushinski, 2001).  Therefore, borrowers repay at high rates, 
even if they had to borrow from moneylenders, in order to protect the value of their social 
collateral (Chavan and Ramakumar, 2002).  Hence, program structures began to converge 
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around those that sought to build and maximize social capital between lenders and the 
community, and within the community, such as the Bank Rayat Indonesia (Patten, Rosengard 
and Johnston Jr., 2001) and Grameen Bank models (Dowla, 2006). 
Early conceptualizations of microcredit as an input into the production process are 
giving way to viewing microcredit as methodology for fostering entrepreneurship (Dowla, 
2006; Pronyk, Harpham, Busza, Phetla, Morison, Hargreaves, Kim, Watts and Porter, 2008; 
Singh and Belwal, 2008).  As a consequence of analyzing microfinance in terms of social 
network theory, there has been some exploration into the notion that microfinance serves as a 
bridge to building social capital, which is itself an input into the opportunity identification 
process (Gomez and Santor, 2001; Olejarova and Alexeeva, 2004).   
Research on entrepreneurial teams has suggested that knowledge spillovers between 
teams can drive innovation.  The social networks created between borrowers that are part of 
lending groups enable the sharing of information, joint problem solving, and creative solution 
seeking, which can lead to improvements in business practices, new opportunity 
identification, and better risk management strategies for the microenterprises being formed 
(Midgely, 2008; Gomez and Santor, 2001). In addition, the value networks forms by such 
enterprises allow the entrepreneurs to better manage external shocks such as natural disasters, 
conflict, and market reversals (Velasco and Marconi, 2004).  Hence, microfinance is seen 
here, not as an end to itself, the provision of credit, but a tool for creating value networks.  
 
Governance issues in Microfinance 
As might be expected a good part of the research is devoted to modeling and 
understanding the monitoring and control mechanism underlying the microfinancing system 
(Conning, 1999; Tedeschi, 2006; Mersland and Strom, 2008).  The concept of group lending, 
coupled with strict repayment terms, little debt forgiveness, and draconian punishment for 
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non-payment (denied access to future credit for the entire group) is designed to create self-
governing mechanisms at the group level (Karlan and Zinman, 2008; Simtowe, Zeller, Phiri 
and Mburu, 2007).  Variations in the elements of a group lending policy are typically 
modeled using two player game theory to discover the impact on strategic non-repayment 
decisions (Dutta and Magableh, 2006; Paxton, Graham and Thraen, 2000).   
Early versions of the game found that extreme moral hazard occurred, such that when 
one borrower from a group defaulted, the entire group tended to default.  Since this result did 
not square with real world observations (the entire group is more likely to cover the losses of 
the defaulter), newer formulations of the game used two stage models to consider the game 
from the borrower’s viewpoint (Conning, 1999; Vigenina and Kritikos, 2004; Paxton, 
Graham and Thraen, 2000). In the first stage, the decision to borrow is modeled in the context 
of whether a borrower decides to join a group or obtain credit from an alternate source, such 
as a moneylender or government grant program.  The second stage then is the decision to 
default (Dutta and Magableh, 2006).   
Inevitably, dual player staged models gain complexity in the form of multiplayer 
simulations in which group dynamics are brought to bear on the decision to default 
(Tedeschi, 2006).  This approach then became the bridge to the research on social collateral, 
in which the governance mechanisms of the group are characterized as bonding, linking and 
bridging social capital (Olejarova and Alexeeva, 2004; Paxton, Graham and Thraen, 2000). 
Here, the research revolves around trust building, maintenance, and the social network 
dimensions that foster group cohesiveness, mutual monitoring, and shared governance 
(Anderson, Locker and Nugent, 2002; Dowla, 2006; Tedeschi, 2006). 
Other research considered the governance implications of the capital structure of an 
mFI, which is a mix of public funds (government and NGO grants), and private funds (equity 
shares, deposits, and investment returns) (Hudon, 2008; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Preters, 
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2002).  Such unique structures (traditional financial institutions are almost always private 
funds, unless the institutions are government owned or have central banking roles) carry 
governance challenges related to the primary operational goals of the institutions (Mersland 
and Strom, 2008).  Those emphasizing outreach tend to put more weight on public funding, 
which then triggers the question of performance measures and accountability, whereas those 
emphasizing sustainability focused on return on capital invested and are better positioned to 
rely more on private funds.   
Related to this is a stream of research looking at the relationship between the formal 
capital markets and the microfinance capital market (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Preters, 
2002).  While the cost of funds in the microfinance market is supposed to be risk determined, 
the models used to determine such rates cannot easily be adapted from those used in the 
formal capital markets where information is more complete (Hudon, 2008).  Yet, if the mFI 
obtains a portion of its capital from the formal capital markets, it must find ways to reconcile 
the differences between the two markets and develop mechanisms to straddle the differential 
risks, for example obtaining government subsidies (Morduch, 1999).  
The capital structure of an mFI is related to the governance priorities of its board, the 
type of board structure and composition, and the relationship between the board and the 
institutions management (Hartarska, 2005; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007).  For example, those 
mFIs that are focused on program sustainability then to charge very high interest rates to 
account for the higher risks they bear.  Yet, studies have shown that the willingness to pay 
high interest rates, often up to 35% is high among microentrepreneurs (Chavan and 
Ramakumar, 2002).  An interesting side effect of high interest rate policies is that there is 
crowds out the market for arbitrage by village elites (who often obtain low cost government 
grants to lend out at higher interest to villages who do not have the same privilege of access) 




Gaps in the Research and Suggestions for Future Research 
Much of the research on mFIs has focused on the purpose, structure, and effectiveness 
of these institutions in poverty alleviation and sustainability.  It has also considered the 
relationship of these organizations with its stakeholder network: government, other NGOs, 
beneficiaries and donors (Marconi and Mosely, 2006).  My reading of the literature has 
revealed a number of important gaps, which represent fruitful opportunities for future 
research.  
As I have observed in this review, the research in this domain began normatively. As 
such, normatively, it would be useful to ask if mFIs represent a substitute to failed institutions 
(i.e., government grant programs or NGO aid agencies) or are they market mechanism to 
augment the role of aid agencies (Marconi and Mosely, 2006; Meyer and Nagarajan, 2006)?  
The reason is that direct aid aims to bring immediate relief to disadvantaged communities 
whereas mFIs aim to create a sustainable source of value creation and a means to break the 
poverty trap.  If the latter perspective holds water, then policies governing mFIs may work 
better if they are constructed to treat these organizations as financial institutions rather than as 
aid agencies.  Formal modeling of outcome tradeoffs under different policy regimes (e.g., 
those emphasizing outreach versus sustainability) would be a technique to answer such 
questions.  Yet, we would not be able to reach this stage in our thinking without first 
considering the descriptive theory underlying the relationship between mFIs and 
entrepreneurship.   
My reading suggests that an understanding of how mFIs foster microenterprises has 
only recently been attempted (e.g., Midgely, 2008; Singh and Belwal, 2008).  The creation of 
the microenterprise is often a black box in the program evaluation models, many of which 
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focus on the outreach outcomes of poverty alleviation.  Part of the challenges in this research 
is data collection and the definition of a sustainable enterprise.   
It may be that microenterprises are naturally short lived, since the opportunities 
themselves may be fleeting. For example, the provision of satellite communication services to 
a village by an entrepreneur is an opportunity until the arrival of widespread cell phone 
infrastructure (Bayes, 2001).  Therefore, large scale empirical research on the impact of the 
social network dynamics of borrowing groups on the incidence of serial entrepreneurship by 
members of the group may represent a theoretically richer direction. 
While the research on mFIs and poverty alleviation is rich, there is less research 
linking mFIs to the secondary impact of poverty alleviation such as nutrition, fertility control, 
healthcare, public hygiene, education, and so on (Nader, 2008; Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo and 
Cloud, 1999).  Given that entrepreneurship requires a minimal level of human capital for a 
starting point, such research may be important to understand the level of such factors that 
ultimately trigger entrepreneurial activity.   
In terms of general theory, such research maybe fundamental in helping us understand 
the necessary human factors that are associated with nascent entrepreneurs.  Most research in 
entrepreneurship has taken place in relatively well developed economies or emerging 
economies with well defined institutions.  Research on the human capital drivers of 
entrepreneurship in the poorest regions of the world may help us develop more complete 
theories of entrepreneurial emergence.   
It has been documented that most of the entrepreneurial activity undertaken by mFI 
credit belongs to women (Nader, 2008; Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo and Cloud, 1999).  In great 
part this is because mFI programs generally target women.  The reason is that women, 
particularly those who are primary household earners, are generally disadvantaged in terms of 
property rights, inheritance rights, court protection, personal safety and health in the poorest 
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regions of the world (Velasco and Marconi, 2004; Barsoum, 2006).  Yet, as keepers of their 
households, women have a great influence on child welfare, health, family continuity, and 
social cohesiveness than men (Nader, 2008).   
The current theoretical understanding of women in entrepreneurship can be extended 
by questions on the relationship between mFI programs and the political and social 
environment surrounding women entrepreneurship in rural and poor regions.  Additionally, 
answers to questions on gender and micro-entrepreneurship could represent new pathways to 
discourse on family sociology and family enterprise (Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo and Cloud, 
1999; Barsoum, 2006). 
According to McKenzie and Woodruff (2006), the lack of access to start up capital 
does not always prevent the creation of positive return enterprises.  In fact, research in 
venture capital highlights the social and managerial competence value that the venture 
capitalist provides to the entrepreneur, rather than the provision of financial resources.    
Therefore, research on the impact of social capital generated through group lending 
on entrepreneurial behavior can be extended to include opportunity identification, learning 
effects, and risk taking behaviors as outcomes (Pronyk, Harpham, Busza, Phetla, Morison, 
Hargreaves, Kim, Watts and Porter, 2008).  This research is less concerned with microcredit 
as a production input as it is a cultural and sociological mechanism for network formation.   
Methodologically, many scholars have commented on the difficulties in measuring 
the impact of mFI on sustainability and poverty alleviation (c.f. Hulme, 2000; Woolcook, 
1999; Manos and Yaron, 2008).  The jury is still out on whether mFI programs really 
alleviate poverty or are they another form of direct subsidy to communities.  The basic reason 
for this is that extant models are rife with endogeneity issues (Hulme, 2000).   
Second, dependent variables in program evaluations are necessarily multidimensional 
with some dimensions being orthogonal to each other (loan recovery versus provision of aid).  
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Therefore, there has yet to be an agreed model for program evaluation.  More significantly, 
this lack of agreement also implies that our empirical models (the dependent variables in 
particular) are unstable.  Theory testing is hence a challenge.   
Finally, as previous scholars have noted, a serious problem with the empirical 
research is the selection bias encountered in the data.  Except in a few cases, where case 
studies are reported, these have been of successful programs (Woolcook, 1999).  Hence, the 
findings (and subsequent policy prescriptions) may be biased by the context and other fixed 
effects peculiar to these programs.   
In the case of large scale data driven studies, programs that report their data have an 
incentive to ‘dress up’ the outcomes because future government and NGO support depends 
on reporting success.  This right tail bias in the data is not easy to correct since it is not 
possible, ex-ante to determine the size of the bias.  Hence, a fruitful avenue for future 
research maybe in apply new approaches to data gathering (such as snowball interviewing) 
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